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The Present and the Past  
in the Religious History of the United States
David D. Hall
   Everywhere in the American media and probably in the European 
media as well, we hear that the religious situation in the United States has 
entered a new phase. Specialists may complain of how the mass media 
report the current scene, and may not agree among themselves on how to 
interpret what is happening. But it seems safe to propose that both parties, 
the media and academic specialists, have identified three principal 
processes of change. Let me describe these three, with several recent 
reports as my starting point.
   One such process is signaled by the title of Diana Eckʼs A New Religious 
America: How a “Christian Country” Has Become the World’s Most Religiously 
Diverse Nation. 1) For her the direction of change lies in the thickening 
presence of groups that are newcomers to the United States, newcomers in 
the sense of arriving in considerable numbers in recent years. Eck employs 
her eye for urban geography to good advantage as she evokes the 
emergence of mosques, Hindu temples, and Buddhist shrines alongside 
the customary presence of Protestant and Catholic churches, some of 
which, by implication, are not doing well.
   A second version of the contemporary scene concerns shifting patterns 
of aﬃliation within Christianity, in particular the upwelling of charismatic 
and Pentecostal groups. The point of departure of Harvey Coxʼs Fire from 
Heaven: The Rise of Pentecostal Spirituality and the Reshaping of Religion in the 
Twenty-First Century, 2) is the worldwide rise of Pentecostal groups in recent 
1 ) (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 2002).
2 ) (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub, 1995).
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decades, the United States included. Although no one knows exactly how 
many Americans adhere to one or another of the dozens of Pentecostal 
denominations –– record-keeping is not their forte –– the membership of 
the largest of them numbers in the millions (The worldwide growth of 
Pentecostalism in Africa and South America is even more astonishing.) If 
we can trust the basic numbers, more Protestants in the United States are 
aﬃliated with Pentecostalism than with all the mainstream denominations 
put together, and surpassed only by Roman Catholicism, and it seems 
likely that as many African Americans are Pentecostal as are members of 
the once hegemonic race-linked Baptist and Methodist denominations. Fire 
from Heaven is also about another recent tendency, the emergence of what 
Cox describes as “fundamentalism” within many corners of Christianity. 
Again he is describing a movement that is usurping the place of the 
“mainstream” denominations that adhere to liberal theologies. From his 
perspective, the current situation is characterized by a contest between 
“fundamentalist” and “Pentecostal” ways of being religious, a contest that 
worries Cox, who is no friend of the outlook he calls fundamentalism. 
Implicitly, the message of Fire from Heaven is that, as the center decays, 
Christianity in America and elsewhere in the world is being renewed from 
the periphery, for better and for worse.
   A third perspective, though concurring in some respects with the two I 
have just cited , may be found in several studies of contemporary 
Christianity by the Princeton sociologist Robert Wuthnow. In the earliest 
and still perhaps the best known of these reports, The Restructuring of 
American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II, 3) Wuthnow discerned 
a realignment of the Protestant churches into two mutually antagonistic 
groups, the “mainstream” or liberal churches (most Methodists, American 
Baptists, Congregationalists, Episcopalians, some Presbyterians, Disciples 
of Christ, etc.) and churches or movements on the political right and 
generally of an “evangelical” outlook (Wuthnow carefully avoided the term 
3) Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American Religion (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988).
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“fundamentalist”). A minor but significant aspect of this analysis was 
Wuthnow ʼs recognition that ,  in the postwar years ,  an extensive 
bureaucracy had emerged among the mainstream congregations, a 
bureaucracy detached from local congregations and deploying its ﬁnancial 
resources (these were considerable in the early 1960s) to advance the 
liberal version of social justice (the “civil rights” movement being the great 
example). As Wuthnow and others have noted, by the end of the 1960s the 
ﬁxation with social justice was alienating many local churches, a discontent 
manifested in the changing demographics of the mainstream groups –– 
that is, their failure to grow in membership as the population increased 
and, by the 1970s, the beginnings of absolute decline in membership that 
continues to the present day. (Again, the statistics are of questionable 
accuracy, with over-reporting of membership a common practice.) 4) Not 
only, then, is the once-hegemonic mainstream contending with a serious 
adversary that challenging the mainstreamʼs very understanding of 
religion, it is doing so in a weakened situation. 5)
   Wuthnow ʼs understanding of change was linked to events and 
circumstances of the 1950s and, especially, the 1960s. He returned to the 
1960s in After Heaven: Spirituality in America Since the 1950s, a book that 
looks back to Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life 6) by Robert Bellah and four other sociologists, a study instantly famous 
for its description of “Sheilaism,” the phenomenon of a self-seeking, 
individualistic (“self-fulfillment”) mode of being religious that the 
pseudonymous Sheila carried on without depending on traditional 
institutions. After Heaven is about postwar changes in the nature of 
4 ) My own local congregation, an Episcopal church in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
is credited by the diocese with roughly double the number of its actual 
members and adherents.
5 ) A case study of this process: R. Stephen Warner, New Wine in Old Wineskins 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
6 ) Wuthnow, After Heaven (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998). Bellah 
et al., Habits of the heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996).
56
spirituality (a term that, against the grain, Wuthnow uses for collective, 
reutilized practices), changes manifested in the eroding of a “dwelling” 
centered spirituality –– “tightly bounded and hierarchical, prescribing 
behavior through a formalized set of rules,” with “institutions” as “the 
building blocks of society, tightly cemented together” –– and the rise of a 
“seeker” version that “emphasizes looser connections, diversity, and 
negotiation... . Rather than rules, symbolic messages prevail,” and “people 
talk about... searching among options.” The data Wuthnow brings together 
include the eﬀects of the “pill” on the age at which women began to have 
children and, in turn, the effects of this change on the timing of young 
peopleʼs decision to marry, itself a stage of life that historically was linked 
with the resumption of church membership. The connections between 
demography and church membership come down to this: as young people 
postponed the age of marriage and of forming families, they ceased to be 
religiously active. This piece of analysis reminds us of a central fact of 
American church “growth” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century (through the 1950s), that the chief source of new members was 
internal, i.e., incorporating the children of existing members, not by 
“converting” the alienated or indifferent to Christianity in any of its 
denominational versions.
   Wuthnow also called attention to the emergence of a “religion industry” 
–– the media, therapists, and others –– that had increasingly displaced the 
traditional forms of religious leadership, especially the clergy, and, in 
doing so, had made it more likely that lay people favor the free-ﬂoating, 
extra institutional, and individualized “spirituality” he has named 
“seeking.” Unlike many other accounts of modern America, After Heaven 
acknowledges the presence of everyday interpretations of the world that 
exclude religion altogether. Not only is the seeker mode of spirituality less 
associated with institutions, it must justify itself “in a world that is almost 
totally secular.” 7)
   Here, then, are three quite diﬀerent reports on what is “new” about the 
7 ) Wuthnow, After Heaven, 138; 10-11.
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religious situation of the United States since the 1960s, and especially what 
is new about Christianity: Eck discerns a de-centered Christianity, 
Wuthnow, a new religion of “seeking” alongside residual elements of 
“dwelling,” Cox a heady wine of renewal via Pentecostalism, but also a 
threatening polarization. These reports are my starting point for pondering 
how the present situation can aﬀect our understanding of the past. As new 
features of Christianity emerge, will historians respond by rewriting what 
happened in the decades and centuries that precede them?  I focus on 
church and state; evangelicalism; and a “seeker” version of religion in 
attempting to answer this question. 
Church and state
Ask Americans of any aﬃliation or, for that matter, of none, if s/he favors 
the separation of church and state, and most will immediately say, yes. 
Most would go on to say that this is what our civil and religious 
institutions practice. (It may be that, half-unconsciously, the average citizen 
has absorbed a powerful dose of “exceptionalism”: it is truly “American” to 
keep the two apart.) Yet this wisdom is not the same as a working 
consensus on how church and state should actually interact. The clash 
between liberal and conservative that Wuthnow mapped in The 
Restructuring of American Religion extends to the question of church-state 
relations in a way that has spilled over into national and local politics, 
most notably with the school prayer amendment to the Constitution that 
President Ronald Reagan endorsed. In turn this agitation has prompted 
historians and other interested parties to revisit the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries in search of “what the founders meant” in 1791 when 
they ratiﬁed the free expression and no establishment clauses of the First 
Amendment , and in search as well of how an informal Protestant 
“establishment” in the mid-nineteenth century could at once defend its 
privileges and insist on religious “liberty,” or the “voluntary principle.”
   What accounts for the eruption of conﬂict about church and state?  Any 
answer must commence by attending to the United States Constitution and 
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how it is constantly re-interpreted. In two Supreme Court cases, the ﬁrst in 
1940, the second in 1947, the Court extended the religious clauses of the 
First Amendment to the states. Between 1789 and 1947, the states had been 
pretty much on their own in how they parceled out privileges and liberties 
relating to religion, the one great exception being the national governmentʼ
s suppression of polygamy in the territory and state of Utah. In the 
aftermath of the rulings of 1940 and 1947, local suits that challenged certain 
customary practices gradually worked their way up to the high court, most 
famously the case of Engel v. Vitale (1962), filed by a secular Jew whose 
local school district in Long Island allowed Christian prayer to take place 
in the classroom, and who won a ruling from the Court that this practice 
violated the establishment language of the First Amendment. The 
following year the Court struck down the practice of having readings from 
the Bible and recitation of the Lordʼs Prayer. Meanwhile lower courts were 
ruling against Sunday “blue laws” instituted in the nineteenth century to 
prevent certain kinds of work on the Christian Sabbath. A second part of 
the answer concerns the Courtʼs endorsement of a “rights revolution” that 
began to unfold in the 1960s. The Court helped enact this revolution in 
decisions such as Roe v. Wade (1973) and others relating to gender, race, and 
sexuality, sometimes by upholding Congressional legislation.
   The larger context for the ﬁrst of these processes was something that 
most Americans in the 1940s took for granted, a complicity between civil 
government and the institutional enterprise of Christianity. Once the Court 
extended the First Amendment to the states, this complicity became 
suspect –– not every feature of it, to be sure (the military services still 
appoint and pay chaplains) –– and more than suspect, something that had 
to be given up. Hence the unwinding of certain practices that favored 
Christianity. And as the Court moved to endorse and expand the rights 
revolution, it did so with the support of liberal/modernist denominations, 
or those groups within them. Both strands of change implied a rethinking 
of how church and state in America should be related, with liberals 
imagining American society as pluralistic, and pluralism as such a good, 
that the state should do nothing to favor one group over another –– or 
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favor all to the same degree. In effect, liberal church people drew 
(unwittingly) on Thomas Jefferson and James Madisonʼs argument that 
religion was a private matter, private because only in this way would the 
civil state not suﬀer from the ambitions and conﬂicts endemic to religion. 
The one person who did cite Jefferson was the Supreme Court justice 
William O. Douglas, who resurrected the phrase “wall of separation” from 
a letter Jeﬀerson wrote in 1804, a phrase that, before he did so, had played 
no role in discussions of the First Amendment.
   These challenges to the status quo were not welcomed by the more 
conservative wing of American Protestantism. Suddenly a new foe loomed 
that Francis J. Schaeﬀer and Tim LaHaye identiﬁed in widely read books 
as liberalism or secular humanism. Blaming these movements for the 
moral confusion of contemporary America, Schaeffer accused liberals of 
abandoning the Christian principles that had made America great. When 
mainstream churches endorsed the assertions of the Supreme Court about 
school prayer and creationism, he interpreted these actions as contradicting 
the Christian-centered politics of the founding fathers, declaring in A 
Christian Manifesto (1981),  “These men... knew they were building on the 
Supreme Being who was the Creator, the ﬁnal reality. And they knew that 
without this foundation everything in the Declaration of Independence 
and all that followed would be sheer unaltered nonsense.” Two years 
earlier, the Southern Baptist minister Jerry Falwell summoned into being 
the Moral Majority, an organization dedicated to reversing moral decline 
by restoring “biblical principles” to our national politics; in practice, this 
meant opposing abortion, homosexuality, feminism, the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and the Supreme Courtʼs decisions on school prayer. The 
Southern Baptist minister Pat Robertson contended for the Republican 
nomination for the presidency in 1988, and in 1989 helped found the 
Christian Coalition, which opposed gay rights and the legality of abortion 
while seeking public tax monies for private religious schools. Historically, 
Baptists in the United States but especially those Baptists on the losing side 
of the Civil War (the Southern Baptist Convention) had strongly insisted 
on the “wall of separation” in order to protect churches from the state (for 
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Madison and Jeﬀerson, the purpose of the “wall” was to protect the state 
from religion). But the SBC bought into the “secular humanism” scare and, 
in the 1980s, began to repudiate its heritage once it came to feel that the 
greater danger was an anti-religious secular state. 
   The pot of church and state thus began to boil, a state of things that 
prompted many activists and historians to reﬂect anew on the question of 
what the Founders had intended with the First Amendment clauses on 
religion. The agitation I have evoked also prompted a second glance at 
nineteenth-century Protestantism and the ways in which it acted as an 
“establishment,” a mentality that some historians would regard as 
persisting until the 1920s or even as late as the 1950s. 8) Concerning the 
Founders, polemicists on each side have busied themselves ransacking the 
historical record, one side extracting statements that make the Founders 
sound like conventional Christians, the other, reconstructing the anxieties 
of a Jeﬀerson and Madison about the future of the new republic were it to 
accept any form of state-aﬃliated Christianity. It was easy for critics of the 
Supreme Court to demonstrate that Jeﬀersonʼs phrase “wall of separation” 
was uniquely his, but just as easy for others to demonstrate that Madison, 
the chief architect of the Bill of Rights, was far from being a pious, praying 
Christian. It was easy, too (and the point was even made by some 
evangelical historians) that the “Christian America” of Francis Schaeﬀerʼs 
imagination was a peculiar animal in 1789 given that three fourths of the 
white population, and a higher percentage of African Americans, were not 
aﬃliated with any church. (But I demur at any argument implying that the 
unaﬃliated were hostile to Christianity or knew nothing of it, at a time, e.g, 
in New England, when the most widely used schoolbook was saturated 
8 ) But for a different point of view, see the essays (and the editorʼs introduction) 
in William R. Hutchison, ed. Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant 
establishment in America, 1900-1960 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). See also Robert Handy, Undermined Establishment: 
Church-State Relations in America, 1880-1920 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1991).
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with Christian doctrine, Christian history, and quotations from Scripture.) 9)
   Given the ambiguities of what is meant by “Christian America” and the 
limitations of any quantitative evidence, the work that has been done on 
mid-nineteenth-century understandings of the separation of church and 
state is especially fresh. Consider, for example, the jurist John T. Noonanʼs 
The Luster of Our Country: The American Experience of Religious Freedom, 10) 
which includes a remarkable chapter (attributed to Alexis de Tocquevilleʼs 
sister) disputing Tocquevilleʼs description of the “voluntary” relationship 
between church and state in Jacksonian America. The fictive Ms. 
Tocqueville, having ventured to the United States to see for herself, 
recognized that her brother hid from his readers the many ways in which 
the civil state continued to support religion. She knew why her brother 
had celebrated the independence of Christianity from the civil state, for 
this (imagined) arrangement was in keeping with his own sympathies for 
the reform program of the French priest Hugues de Lemennais, who had 
called on the French national church to relinquish its privileged situation 
and embrace a pluralist (democratic) society. In sum, the fictive sister 
recognized that Tocqueville aligned his narrative with a political situation 
in France. From a second important study, Philip Hamburgerʼs Separation 
of Church and State: A Theologically Liberal, Anti-Catholic, and American 
Principle, 11) we learn that the emergence of Catholicism as a significance 
presence in mid-nineteenth-century America prompted evangelical 
Protestants to brandish the separation of church and state as a way of 
being anti-Catholic. Few of these evangelicals intended to jettison the 
privileges they received from the civil state. Indeed, the German-American 
Philip Schaff, an articulate spokesman for religious freedom, led a 
9 ) Good data may be found in Christine Heyrman, Southern Cross: The Beginnings 
of the Bible Belt (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1997), and 
James H. Hutson, Forgotten Features of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious 
Themes in the Early American Republic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003).
10) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
11) Hamburger, Separation of Church and State: A Theologically Liberal, Anti-Catholic, 
and American Principle (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
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movement after the Civil War to defend the sanctity of the Sabbath by 
adding an amendment to the Constitution. Hamburger and others are thus 
suggesting that the “separation of church and state,” as represented by 
Protestants in the nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries, was a 
socio-political construction brought into being in order to legitimize anti-
Catholicism and to mask their privileged situation vis-a-vis the civil state.
   Perhaps it is an unintended irony that this scholarship can serve 
conservatives as much or more as it serves liberals. Cherished though the 
concept of the “separation of church and state” may be, it remains open to 
interpretations of the kind that the evangelical right is providing. They are 
not wrong; indeed, they have a good deal of history on their side. They 
contest what they quite rightly regard as a secular/liberal glossing of the 
concept to mean that religion must be excluded from the sphere of 
democratic citizenship. As the historian John F. Wilson has noted, the 
founding fathers did not propose the “wholesale segregation [of religion] 
from government  –– the kind of resolution proposed in the French 
Revolution –– for separationist logic opens the way for radical 
secularization as a social policy.” 12) My broader point holds for 
contemporary evangelicals as well as for the liberals: church and state has 
become one of the sites of struggle about the past, liberals doing so in 
order to preserve their version of pluralism and the rights revolution that 
effectively secularizes the nation state, conservatives and evangelicals 
seeking to re-insert their moral agenda into public life.
   This agitation has its parallel in the agitation among Europeans over 
matters like the veil. To venture into comparative history, I note that in the 
French case, the question is whether the concept of citizenship, and the 
rights that go with it, prohibits or allows certain expressions of religious 
difference, with many French asserting that citizenship is a wholly 
secular category that overrides all expressions of religious difference 
12) John F. Wilson, “Religion, Government, and Power in the New American 
Nation,” in Religion and American Politics From the Colonial Period to the 1980s, ed. 
Mark A. Noll (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 77-91.
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in public spaces such as schools. Until quite recently, the secular and 
the religious were accommodated in the American understanding of 
citizenship, but the tension between these two has become so great that, 
on matters of church and state, some Americans have moved closer to a 
European understanding of citizenship and civil institutions –– that is, the 
importance of preserving –– which in the United States means enacting 
more fully –– their religiously neutral or “secular” situation. 13)
 Evangelicalism
I turn to the second of my topics, evangelicalism, the question being, as 
before, how is the present situation aﬀecting how we understand the past? 
A fully satisfying answer to this question is beyond my means in this 
essay, the reason being that evangelicalism takes many different forms, 
each with its own relationship to the past. Two aspects of an ongoing, 
dynamic, and complicated rewriting of the past must suffice, first, the 
eﬀorts to diﬀerentiate evangelicalism from fundamentalism and second, a 
line of work concerned with the consequences of liberalism.
   In the post war years when liberal versions of the American past 
dominated, it became accepted wisdom to characterize evangelicalism as 
anti-intellectual, proof being the Scopes trial of 1925 and, in the late 
nineteenth century, the hostile reaction of certain Protestant theologians to 
Darwinism, the newer currents of biblical scholarship, and the like, a poster 
child in this respect being Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological 
Seminary. Social history was evoked to support the thesis that by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, evangelicals or “fundamentalists” were 
the left behind, people living in those parts of the United States (the South) 
least touched by the tendencies grouped together under modernization.
13) To cite a local example: the secularizing of the Harvard Divinity School in 
recent years, we no longer hold our fall and spring convocations in the 
university church because it is associated with Christianity; and the texts 
quoted during these events are drawn from a wide array of sources, include 
ones that by traditional criteria are marginally “religious.”
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   Recent work tells a very diﬀerent story. Much of this scholarship is the 
doing of a group of self-professedly “evangelical historians,” most notably 
George Marsden and Mark A. Noll. Marsden and Noll earned their 
doctorates at mainstream institutions (Marsden trained under Sydney 
Ahlstrom at Yale), and both have always respected the standards of inquiry 
and research insisted upon within the secular academy. But both have also 
wanted to reclaim the evangelical tradition from obfuscation and cultural 
ignorance. Interestingly, both have also criticized the speculations of 
Francis Schaeﬀer and others about the founding fathers. 14) Marsden and 
Noll take seriously the faculty, Hodge included, who taught at Princeton 
Seminary, treating them not as head-in-the-sand, defensive ﬁgures but as 
intellectuals capable of a serious engagement with the limitations of 
Darwinian theory c. 1870. As Noll in particular has argued, the Princeton 
theologians were not opposed to science or reason per se, even if (in 
hindsight) their version of science was “Baconian” at a time when other 
approaches were beginning to emerge. 15) Taking evangelicalism seriously 
as an intellectual movement has also meant acknowledging the importance 
of the end times as foretold in Scripture to most nineteenth-century 
American Protestants –– as it would become again for some American 
Protestants in the closing decades of the twentieth century. The recovery of 
this way of thinking has prompted a fresh understanding of the origins of 
fundamentalism, which now seems a movement indebted as much or 
more to a pre-millenialist understanding of Christian history –– owed in 
signiﬁcant measure to a handful of British religious ﬁgures –– as it does to 
anti-Darwinism. Among the ﬁgures who combined evangelical revivalism 
with pre-millennialism and dispensationalism was the layman Dwight L. 
Moody, who helped bring into being a cluster of institutions that would 
14) Mark A. Noll et al., The Search for Christian America (Colorado Springs: Helmers 
and Howard, 1989).
15) See also E. Brooks Holifield, The Gentlemen Theologians (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1978) and earlier. Theodore Dwight Bozeman, Prostestants in 
an Age of Science: The Baconian Ideal and Ante-bellum American Religious Thought 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977).
The Present and the Past in the Religious History of the United States 65
sustain these ideas in the twentieth century. To recover these aspects of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is to diminish the signiﬁcance of 
the Scopes trial and to increase, sharply so, the signiﬁcance of theological 
currents that ﬂourished in metropolitan centers in the north and did so via 
a complex infrastructure of colleges, biblical institutions, publications, 
revivals, scholarship, radio ministries, and voluntary associations, 
including, for example, the impressive Campus Crusade for Christ 
International (1951) that, by 2003, had a worldwide staﬀ of 26,000 persons 
engaged in evangelism. If we insist on re-inserting the Scopes trial into this 
narrative, then its significance may become its capacity to nourish an 
“outsider” identity that , in sociological language , made for strong 
communities at a time when liberal Protestantism, with its guise of 
establishment, was becoming absorbed into the general culture. The best 
telling of this story remains Marsdenʼs Fundamentalism and American 
Culture, a story of an unexpected rupture within the ranks of evangelicals 
as some turned away from postmillennial thinking. 16)
   An excursus: a sad tendency of university-based religionists, and 
certainly of the liberal media, is to make much more of fundamentalism 
with a capital F than the actual phenomenon deserves, as when the 
splintering of c. 1890-1920 Protestantism is depicted solely as a clash 
between liberals and “fundamentalists.” That is, religionists have allowed 
“fundamentalism” to become a sponge that absorbs a great deal of what 
should properly be described as evangelicalism. In point of fact, the 
assertions packaged in 1910 as “Fundamentals” provoked controversy only 
in a small number of denominations, chiefly Presbyterian and Baptist, 
where battle lines were also forming as liberal and modernist theologians, 
who increasingly dominated seminaries in the north and west, abandoned 
doctrinal tests for future ministers, discarded the emphasis on sin, 
repentance, and conversion within Reformed (evangelical) theology, 
emphasized the social gospel as the proper mission of the church, and 
16) Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century 
Evangelicalism 1870-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
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accepted a historical account of the making and meaning of Scripture. 
Liberals past and present (and Harvey Cox is such a liberal) may beneﬁt 
polemically by exaggerating the reach and power of “Fundamentalism,” 
but we are better served as historians by placing it in a much broader 
context.
   Another vein of evangelical scholarship has been its attention to the 
liberal rapprochement with modernism. This scholarship is instructive on 
the intellectual dimensions of secularization, a particular theme of 
Marsdenʼs The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment 
to Established Nonbelief, but illuminated with more precision, perhaps, in D. 
G. Hartʼs account of the emergence of religion as a ﬁeld of study within the 
modern college and university. 17) Hart, an evangelical historian with strong 
theological interests, shows how the Protestant clergy and church leaders 
who persuaded universities that religion was a legitimate field of study 
could only do so by recasting what religion itself signiﬁed, as in accepting 
the normative claims of “the scientiﬁc” (and hence, relinquishing any claim 
to Christianity as containing distinctive forms of truth). An old saying has 
it that religion begat prosperity, and the daughter devoured the mother. 
Hartʼs is a similar narrative: Christian leaders begat religious studies, and 
religious studies (with a backward glance at the Enlightenment) gave birth 
to the category “religion” as something wholly natural. A perfect 
illustration of this process is the situation at my own academic institution, 
the Divinity School at Harvard, where no candidate for appointment can 
be asked his or her own religious views –– these are utterly “private,” while 
the (public) pace for teaching and research is neutral, e.g., secular. 
Seeker religion
Let me touch briefly on a third vein of work that takes as its point of 
17) Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to 
Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and Hart, The 
University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in American Higher Education 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press: 1999).
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departure the “religion industry” and “seeker spirituality,” work prompted 
in part by the decline of Protestant liberalism and the emergence of 
rootless forms of spirituality to such prominence. Does religious history 
ﬁgure in the story of a “culture of consumption” that so many historians 
(even historians of the early modern period) ﬁnd attractive?  The answer is 
emphatically yes, as demonstrated in Leigh E. Schmidtʼs fascinating 
narrative of the intersections of consumer capitalism and religion in 
Consumer Rites: The Buying and Selling of American Holidays. 18)
   As for pluralism, it is beginning to inform how we write about colonies 
and new nation; in recent years, two proposals for textbooks that have 
come my way begin by highlighting “diversity.” In this context, it is 
important to note three constraints on the thesis of Eckʼs book. The ﬁrst is a 
matter of religious demographics. America is as “Christian” today as it was 
in 1900, for Eckʼs analysis overlooks the aﬄiations of the majority of new 
immigrants, many of whom bring to the United States a relatively 
conservative form of Christian: for example, South Koreans trained in 
Methodism and Presbyterianism, Africans carrying with them the legacies 
of nineteenth-century evangelicalism. 19)
   The second concerns the longer trajectory of pluralism. As William R. 
Hutchison demonstrated in Religious Pluralism in America: The Contentious 
History of a Founding Ideal, pluralism, meaning in this instance several 
diﬀerent forms of Christianity, has been a feature of American society for 
more than two centuries. From Hutchisonʼs perspective, what has changed 
in the modern period is how this fact of plurality (a better word for what he 
is describing than pluralism) has been evaluated. Eck is witness to a 
particular understanding of the term that combines theological, social, and 
18) Meredith McGuire, Ritual Healing in Suburban America (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1988), telling of a middle aged woman who, in the 
course of a single day, employs five different strategies of healing; Schmidt, 
Consumer Rites: The Buying and Selling of American Holidays (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995).
19) A point made by Philip Jenkins in The New Christendom: The Coming of Global 
Christianity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), noting also that there is 
more diversity by numbers in certain European countries.
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political elements. Theologically , she argues that Americans (and 
hypothetically, all humans) participate in a generalized category of 
“religion” to which each of the historical “world religions” contributes 
something and takes away something. No one faith possesses the full 
truth. In turn this argument supports her position that the “new” America 
is ultimately a harmonial culture notwithstanding the diﬀerences between 
faith communities. The greater the pluralism, the greater the possibilities 
for “symphony,” an analogy Eck borrows from the early twentieth social 
theorist Horace Kallan. Pluralism means, getting along better and better.
   The third constraint concerns the over estimating of what is new. The 
past can rear up and bit the present, either to remind us of continuities or 
to instruct us that every report of the “new” is refracted through a political 
or ideological framework. If we turn to race and Christianity, the past 
reminds us that African Americans affiliate with race-specific 
denominations today as much as they did in 1880.
Wider implications
My own specialty, the history of sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
Puritanism, has also been aﬀected by these trends. At one time a movement 
that seemed coherent, with clear boundaries, Puritanism has fractured into 
many parts, with outsiders being given as much or more attention than 
those who led the institutions of church and state –– and the ranks of 
outsiders now stretch as far as the Native Americans, who in one recent 
monograph figure as a reason why the colonists adopted the baptismal 
policy nicknamed the “half-way covenant.” Absurd on the face of it, such 
assertions are accompanied with a broader reluctance to grant Puritanism 
the status of “origins” of American culture, as book titles of c. 1975 (and 
earlier) so routinely declared.
   Once upon a time the puritans “were good to think,” as anthropologists 
used to say of pigs in some cultures: any aspect of Puritanism had its 
consequences for the making of a national culture. But these claims are 
now in doubt. Consider, for example, the reputation of the eighteenth-
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century Protestant minister-theologian Jonathan Edwards, considered by 
some as the most important theologian in our religious history (or possibly 
paired with Bushnell, Rauschenbusch, and the Niebuhrs). Who is entitled 
to claim him as forerunner?  Certainly not Pentecostals and charismatics, 
given his intense dislike of the “New Lights” of the 1740s. For Perry Miller, 
Edwards was the proto-democratic, anti-bourgeois/capitalist prophet who 
preﬁgured Reinhold Niebuhr. For the contemporary evangelical historians 
George Marsden and Mark Noll, Edwards was too complicit with an 
established church and political hierarchy to be seen as the creator of the 
democratic evangelicalism of the nineteenth century. 20) But for other 
evangelicals, Edwards remains a living ﬁgure through books like his life of 
the heroic missionary David Brainerd, the most reprinted of all of 
Edwardsʼs publications. Appropriately, the tercentenary of his birth (2006) 
was celebrated in conferences organized, on the one hand, by mainstream 
scholars, some of them of evangelical affiliations, and on the other, by 
scholars who have never been part of the “Edwards establishment.”
   Taking the present as our starting point for understanding the past is 
inescapable. Yet the beneﬁts of doing can have unexpected consequences. I 
hope this survey of recent work makes more evident both the rewards and 
the risks of trying to assess the contemporary scene and working 
backwards from it.
20) Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 
and the account of Edwards in Noll, Americaʼs God).
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Abstract
   Christianity in the United States is undergoing several transitions, or so 
it is argued in provocative and important books published in recent years 
(many more such books have appeared than could be cited in this essay). 
This essay describes three such reports, each signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 
the other; and after doing so, takes up the question of how recent 
developments and conﬂicts within Christianity in the United States aﬀect 
the work of historians, a question answered by looking at the “separation 
of church and state,” a deeply contested matter in recent scholarship and 
popular polemics;  the history and significance of evangelicalism and 
“Fundamentalism,” as these too have been debated among historians; 
transformations of “spirituality” or certain kinds of practice, intersecting 
with the emergence of a consumer culture;  and, much more briefly, the 
history of the Puritan movement as it has been recently debated and 
rethought.
   Two conclusions emerge from this review of debates about Christianity 
in America, past and present.  The ﬁrst concerns the “decline” of what are 
known as “mainstream” Protestant denominations or theologies.  It is 
certain that the influence and size of these denominations is not what it 
used to be, but their decline has not necessarily made the United States less 
“Christian” –– merely, Christian in unexpected or novel ways, like those 
associated with Pentecostalism or spiritual “seeking.” The second 
conclusion is that a major question like the meaning of church and state in 
the United States is being answered quite diﬀerently depending on oneʼs 
theological or political aﬃliation; i.e., all attempts to settle, once and for all, 
the meaning of church and state (as though the Constitution did this for 
us) are vain, because debate arises out of diﬀerent expectations for what 
religion should be doing, politically.
